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One of the complexities overarching the concept of Islamic insurance is anchored in the 
belief system pertaining to fundamental Islamic Law, while another is embedded in the role 
of profit within the takaful contract. The purpose of this study is to empirically explore the 
association between the awareness of the existence of Islamic insurance (takaful) and 
religious perceptions of this financial service. 
I think the way to move will be to identify more people within the Malay/Muslim community 
who have an interest in this type of insurance. Perhaps AMP [Association of Muslim 
Professionals] can do a survey to produce statistics to show that there is a potential demand 
for this type of service before approaching the banks and insurance companies. Up to now my 
impression is that the demand is either unknown or not sufficiently known for the insurance 
companies themselves to initiate something. 
Dr Richard Hu 
Former Finance Minister, Republic of Singapore1 
 
1. Introduction 
According to the teachings of Islam, Muslims are to accept any misfortune that befalls them 
as the will of Allah, but they are also exhorted to take positive steps to minimize unfortunate 
events. An insurance contract reduces the risk of loss due to accident or ill-fated 
circumstance. Outside of Islam, this undertaking is unproblematic; however, its conformity to 
Islamic law, or Shariah, is debated. Muslim scholars differ in their views on the 
permissibility (halal) or prohibition (haram) of insurance. 
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Some accept insurance in its traditional form as part and parcel of the necessary development 
of modern Islamic concepts. Based on the established maxim that the original lawful position 
on any matter is permissibility until there is evidence prohibiting it, they assert there is no 
injunction (nass) against conventional insurance and it should be allowed (mubah). 
Furthermore, Islam describes the universe as an adornment of Allah (The Holy Quran, 7:32), 
and Muslims are allowed to use the resources of the universe, and all that is needed to 
facilitate this usage are thus permissible (The Holy Quran, 45:13). 
Others argue that insurance should be prohibited following the view that ‘each contract 
whose consequences are held in ignorance includes a form of aleatory’. The presence of 
insurable interest would not save the commercial insurance contract from Shariah law 
because the outcome of an insurance contract is, by its very nature, unknown. Such a contract 
would possess the prohibited elements of uncertainty of outcome (gharar) and gambling 
(maisir). 
In addition, when purchasing a conventional insurance policy, the policyholder is assured of 
promised returns at the end of the insurance term if timely premium payments are made. 
Once again, the outcome may contravene the spirit of Shariah law, which prohibits a 
predetermined return, or riba. 
 
II. The Islamic Alternative 
The basic motive for takaful under the Islamic value system is to bring equity to all parties 
involved, and the objective of the contract should be to help other policyholders through bad 
times. Earning profits should not be the main goal, although sharing any profits generated 
incidentally is acceptable (Maysami and Kwon, 1999). 
In accordance with the principle of joint guarantee (tabarru) to help others, each policyholder 
willingly agrees to give a portion of the paid premium to other policyholders who may be in 
need of financial assistance. The claimants, in turn, must realize that the amount paid to them 
has come from fellow policyholders, and should not indulge in any profiteering and self-
serving activities that may be detrimental to the interests of the other policyholders. 
To claim benefits from a life insurance policy, only proof of death is needed. The cause of 
death does not matter because it is the will of Allah that determines all death. If the assured 
dies before the maturity of the policy, the beneficiary, acting as a trustee, would claim the 
total premiums paid and the share of profits and would distribute it among the heirs of the 
assured deceased according to the principles of inheritance (mirath) and bequest (wasiyah). 
In addition, a donation from the company's charitable fund to the beneficiary/heirs of the 
assured is possible based on their financial needs. If the assured is alive upon the maturity of 
the policy, he may claim the total amount of premiums paid, together with a share of the 
profits. 
The concept of Al-mudarabah prescribes that all policyholders must agree to share profits (or 
losses) from the undertaking (Maysami et al. 1997). Similarly, agents who sell takaful life 
policies would not be paid a commission but receive a salary equal to a share of the profits 
made by the company as well as dividend and bonus payments, if any. These same conditions 
apply to the management. This would result in a reduction in moral hazard issues leading to 
more confidence in the fund (Billah, 1996). 
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Every takaful policyholder has the right to know how their money is utilized, how the 
surrender value is computed, and how profits from various investments are divided. As a 
matter of fact, takaful policyholders must be certain that neither returns nor funds paid out in 
claim settlements originate from unacceptable means such as investments in stocks of 
companies producing non-halal goods (alcohol or tobacco, for example) or services 
(gambling, for instance). 
Finally, if the holder of an Islamic insurance policy decides to terminate a policy in a manner 
that is not provided for under terms of the contract, premiums are refundable along with any 
corresponding surrender value less administrative fees. 
 
III. Research Hypothesis and Methodology 
One of the complexities overarching the concept of Islamic insurance is anchored in the 
belief system pertaining to fundamental Islamic Law, while another is embedded in the role 
of profit within the takaful contract. Potential holders of a takaful contract may assume that 
any mention of profit renders it isomorphic with conventional insurance. This, of course, is 
not the correct perception. Misunderstanding this point alone may differentiate more liberal 
Muslims receptive to takaful from arch-conservatives who may shun any insurance 
altogether. 
This leads to the expectation in this study that awareness of the availability of Islamic 
insurance is linked to perceptions or beliefs about Islamic fundamentals on religious and 
social goals. While statements of hypotheses are generally reserved for more rigorous 
theoretical development, for parsimonious reasons we defer to testing a formal hypothesis 
rather than a research question as follows: 
H1: Awareness of the takaful contract is associated with fundamental perceptions of Islamic 
principles. 
Singapore is an ideal location to test such hypothesis given the multi-racial, multi-religious 
nature of the population, its rather ‘Westernized’ way of life, and its proximity to Muslim-
majority Malaysia and Indonesia. 
 
IV. Method 
The data generated for this study is part of a larger research project where careful attention 
was given to generating a Muslim sample that matched Singaporean demographics very 
closely.2 Specific to this study, the survey instrument contained a section with questions for 
Muslim respondents only. A comparison of the non-Muslim and Muslim sub-samples for the 
set of characteristics did not manifest any significant differences.3 
Measures 
For testing purposes, categorical data were obtained for two dimensions. One dimension 
involved ascertaining perceptions on the nature or properties of Islamic insurance. Thus, the 
first statement required a yes/no response to: (1) ‘The emphasis of Islamic insurance is on 
religious and social goals rather than profit-making.’ The second dimension focused on the 
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awareness of the takaful insurance concept, and required a yes/no response to: (2) ‘Are you 
familiar with Islamic insurance?’ 
The third question involved cross-classification and asked those who were aware of Islamic 
insurance to identify the most important factor when asked: (3) ‘You would consider buying 
Islamic insurance because of: (a) religious reasons; (b) better returns; (c) ability to meet 
financial needs better; or (d) transparency (i.e., to know how profits are being distributed)’. 
The fourth question also involved cross-classification and asked respondents who 
were unaware of Islamic insurance the following: (4) ‘Profit returns from insurance are 
consistent with Muslim principles?’ 
 
V. Results 
Based on data from the sub-sample of Muslim responses, a two dimensional contingency 
table was constructed (Table 1). The vertical dimension represents respondents’ awareness of 
the availability of Islamic insurance products – column 1 and column 2 represent awareness 
and non-awareness, respectively. The horizontal dimension deals with perceptions relating to 
Muslim beliefs about the nature of Islamic insurance. Perceptions in row 1 reflect the view 
that profit-making from insurance is compatible with Islamic principles whereas row 2 
reflects perceptions that encompass religion and social goals but not profit-making. They are 
labelled liberal and conservative Islamic principles, respectively. 
Table 1: Nature and awareness dimensions of Islamic insurance 
 
The total frequency of 58 in row 2 was determined from responses to question (1). Likewise, 
the frequencies of 40 in column 1 and 44 in column 2 were determined from responses to 
question (2). The joint frequencies of 25 in cell 1 and 15 in cell 3 resulted from responses to 
question (3). Finally, the joint frequencies of 1 in cell 2 and 43 in cell 4 emerged from 
responses to question (4). 
Hypothesis H1 asserts a linkage between the nature of Islamic insurance and its awareness 
among the Muslim population. The frequencies displayed in Table 1 permit a chi-square test 
of independence between the two dimensions, the results of which suggest that the null 
hypothesis of independence must be rejected, thus providing support for hypothesis H1.4 
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Table 1 data further suggest that the link between those who are aware/unaware of Islamic 
insurance and the nature of Islamic insurance is not uniform. For example, column 2 shows 
that little awareness is associated with a large conservative element. Interestingly, the data in 
column 1 manifests an inverse relationship. Indeed, greater awareness (cell 1) appears to be 
related to a larger liberal perception of the nature of Islamic insurance. This suggests that in 
moving from unawareness to recognition there is a corresponding shift from conservative to 
liberal beliefs about the nature of Islamic insurance. 
Respondents in cell 3 were aware of the takaful contract but held conservative perceptions 
about the nature of Islamic insurance. As an internal validity check, all Muslim respondents 
were asked if it was sinful to buy conventional insurance. Just over 14% of the sample 
indicated that it was, largely, it is assumed, because of the profit return concept. This number 
is not significantly different from the 15 in cell 3 in terms of the total sub-sample. 
Evidence from Table 1 further suggests that only 47.6% (cell 1) of Muslim respondents were 
aware of its availability thus supporting the conjecture of the Finance Minister. More 
importantly, the results suggest that, of this percentage, only 62.5% are inclined to have 
liberal perceptions regarding the nature of Islamic insurance. This means that fewer than 30% 
of the respondents appear to be favourably disposed to the concept of the takaful contract. 
In short, the results of this study show that Muslims who are supposedly the target recipient 
of Islamic insurance products remain largely unaware of the existence of these services. 
Moreover, the results show that Muslims with ‘conservative values’ are less aware of Islamic 
insurance in particular as compared with Muslims with ‘liberal values’. 
This has immense implications for marketing this product. First, there is a large segment of 
the Muslim population that needs to be exposed to its existence. Second, the exact nature of 
the takaful contract requires careful dissemination to this potential audience. It appears from 
the results of this study that there is a significant association between not just becoming 
aware of Islamic insurance but the more fundamental issue of liberal versus conservative 
beliefs in the nature of the takaful contract. 
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‘Window of Opportunities for Islamic Financing’, Karayawan, Volume 3. 
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In the interest of brevity, the details on the design, distribution and statistical analysis of 
the survey questionnaire are not included in this study. It suffices to state that every effort 
was taken to ensure that proper sampling and statistical methods were adhered to. Interested 




Complete information regarding the descriptive/demographic characteristics of the sample 
for this study as well as for the larger study, which forms the basis of the current one, is 




=36.13 (p<0.001, d.f.=1) 
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